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Ideology
Runa Das
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ABSTRACT This article examines the relationship between gender, nations and
nationalisms vis-a-vis the Indian state’s nationalist identity and perceptions of
(in)security. It explores how the postcolonial Indian state’s project of nation-build-
ing – reflective of a western secular-modern identity (under the Congress Party) and
a Hindutva-dominated identity (under the BJP) – incorporates gender, with continu-
ities and discontinuities, to articulate divergent forms of nationalist/communalist
identities, ‘cartographic anxieties’ and nuclear (in)securities. The article contends
that with the recent rise of the Hindu-Right BJP, guided by Hindutva ideology, the
nature of representing the Indian nation, its women and (in)securities has changed
from a geopolitical to a cultural perception – thereby necessitating a rereading of the
Indian nation, nationalism, gender and its perceptions of (in)security.
KEY WORDS gender ◆ Hindutva ◆ identity ◆ India ◆ insecurity ◆ nation ◆ nation-
alism ◆ security ◆ state
INTRODUCTION
It is apparent that religion and politics are intimately related and that religion
or religious ideologies play a crucial role in negotiating identities of gender,
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nations and nationalisms. Feminists have questioned the relationship
between gender, nation and nationalism, exploring particularly how ‘under-
lying both notions of nations and the politics of nation-building is a gendered
power politics’ (Einhorn, 2006: 196). Cognizant of rare non-feminist scholar-
ship that has unravelled the fragmented nature of traditional understandings
of nationalism (Anderson, 1983; Chatterjee, 1995; Hobsbawm, 1983), the fem-
inist challenges to nationalism, pioneered by Enloe (1993), have analysed the
gendered nature of nations and nationalisms along three lines: first, exposing
how nationalisms based on public/private dichotomies have used women as
symbols and victims in ‘bounding’ the nation (Anthias and Yuval-Davis,
1989; Jayawardena, 1986; Yuval-Davis, 1997); second, showing how ‘milita-
rized’ masculinities of national identities embedded in states’ military poli-
cies legitimize sexual violence in the name of conflict resolution (Enloe, 1993,
2000; see also Chenoy, 2002; Cohn, 1989); and third, examining how anti-colo-
nial/nationalist struggles – as male-dominated agendas – have secured
women’s participation in such struggles only to push women to the margins
during later periods of state consolidation (Jayawardena, 1986; Sharoni,
1998).
While early feminist scholarship on gender, nation and nationalisms
has treated these aspects as arbitrary constructs, recent feminist work
has highlighted discursive/representational aspects underpinning the
connections between gender, nation and nationalisms. These discursive
aspects highlight how male-centric nationalisms or nationalist ideolo-
gies ‘construct and functionalize women through discourses of appro-
priate femininity [and masculinity]’ to forge nations/nationalisms
(Peterson and Runyan, 1998: 8); how nationalist discourses use ‘images
and practices of sexuality [as] the malleable means of reproducing
homogeneous and bounded [nations]’ (Dwyer, 2000: 27); and, how
nationalist ideologies deploy women’s sexuality in ‘us’ vs ‘them’ frames
to project ‘dangerous sexuality . . . emanating from either “enemies”
within, or the “Other” nation’s men’ (Einhorn, 2006: 202; Mayer, 2000).
Significant in this context is Einhorn’s (2006: 202) observation that the
interweaving of sexuality with discourses of nation and nationalism is
used to justify a ‘moral imperative requiring women both to “represent”
the nation through moral virtue and social norms, and to reproduce the
national/ethnic groups in biological and cultural terms’. This gendered
nationalist process, which Einhorn (2006: 202) calls the ‘politics of
national reproduction’, furthermore implies that ‘nationalist ideologies
rely on constructions of masculinity and femininity to ”naturalize”
power struggles over who gets to define what the nation stands for’
(Einhorn, 2006: 199). Nations are thus not just ‘systems of cultural rep-
resentation’, but also ‘constitutive of people’s identities through social
contests that are frequently violent and always gendered’ (McClintock,
1997: 89).
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In this article, I draw from the feminist literature on gender, nations and
nationalisms to highlight the gender question in India’s nationalist (in)secu-
rity politics. I interrogate this gender problematique by locating the question
vis-a-vis the Indian state’s nationalist identity, where the state’s identity –
fraught between secular-modernity and Hindutva ideology – has enabled
the state to utilize gender to remap the nation, nationalism and its political
(in)securities. The central research question is thus posed: whether and how
the postcolonial Indian state’s project of nation-building – reflective of a
western secular-modern identity (under the Congress Party) and a
Hindutva ideology (under the BJP)1 – incorporates gender, with continuities
and discontinuities, to articulate divergent forms of nationalist identities,
‘cartographic anxieties’ and nuclear (in)securities.2
In initiating this analysis, as an international security/feminist scholar,
I begin with the assumption that the central attributes of nation formation
in international politics require the mapping of a sovereign territorial
space, or a ‘geopolitical’ vision, which accompanies certain ‘cartographic
anxieties’ reflective of the nation’s boundary-making compulsions
(Krishna, 1996). (I define the terms geopolitical vision and cartographic
anxieties in the following section.) Accordingly, postcolonial nations,
including India, have tried to configure their geopolitical visions by con-
solidating their territories; investing them with national sovereignty; and
securing them from Others, often by recourse to complex gender repre-
sentations. Thus, representations of gender in the task of nation-making
are nothing new and have even been evidenced in Indian politics.
Accepting this premise, what I explore in this article is how, with the rise
of the recent Hindu-Right BJP government in India, guided by the
Hindutva ideology, the nature of representing the Indian nation, its
women and national (in)securities has changed from a geopolitical to a
cultural perception. This represents a shift from a ‘political’ to a ‘cultural’
reconstruction of identities and political (in)securities by the BJP necessi-
tating a rereading of the Indian nation, nationalism, gender and national
(in)securities. In this sense, my study of the Indian nation, constructions
of gender and representations of national (in)securities – albeit in a
local/cultural context – also initiates an intellectual engagement to con-
nect the literature on gender and nationalism in interdisciplinary ways to
the discourses and practices of international security/relations.
In this article, I explore the discursive links between gender, nationalism
and national (in)securities by following a critical discourse analysis. Critical
discourse analysis provides a researcher with the interpretative or intersub-
jective framework to explore how specific ‘discourse’ structures (such as
power and ideological hegemony) embedded in the organization and impli-
cation of language may reproduce and legitimize dominance in political,
social and cultural contexts (Stubbs, 1983). I have collected my data for this
article by consulting primary documents such as Indian parliamentary
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debates, election manifestos, journals, newspapers, magazines and pam-
phlets of both the Congress Party and the BJP; as well as by listening to
speeches of Congress and BJP politicians on television, radio and at public
gatherings. These have been supplemented by semi-structured open-ended
interviews with politicians and activists of the Congress Party and BJP – male
and female – which I conducted during my field trips to New Delhi (India)
in the summers of 2002–4. Through a critical discursive analysis of the con-
tents and implications of these texts and interviews, I have tried to analyse
the intersubjective links between the Indian political leaders’ ideologies, artic-
ulation of India’s nationalist and gender identities, and political (in)securities.
The article is divided into the following sections: the first part intro-
duces the terms geopolitical visions, cartographic anxieties and (in)secu-
rity imaginaries since I draw significantly from these terms to delineate
the links between gender, nationalism and the articulation of political
(in)securities in the Indian context. The second part examines nationalism
and nationalist identity in postcolonial India under the Congress Party as
an outcome of secular-modernity. It demonstrates how gender remained
at that time integral to the Indian state’s masculinity as a means by which
to articulate the nation’s cartographic anxieties and (in)securities. The
third part explores the rearticulation of India’s nationalist discourse by
the BJP and shows how the BJP’s Hindu masculinity – different from the
Congress Party’s traditional/Indian masculinity – has enabled the party
to use feminism in both militant and traditional ways to service cultural
nationalism, the location of danger and perceptions of nuclear (in)secu-
rity. I conclude by analysing the connections between colonial legacies,
secular-modernity and Hindutva identity that continue to implicate post-
colonial India’s nationalist identities, configurations of masculinities, gen-
der and national (in)securities.
GEOPOLITICAL VISIONS, CARTOGRAPHIC ANXIETIES AND
(IN)SECURITY IMAGINARIES
A geopolitical vision includes ‘any idea concerning the relation between
one’s own and other places, involving feelings of (in)security and/or
invoking ideas about a collective mission or foreign policy strategy’
(Dijkink, 1996: 11). In this sense, a geopolitical vision also reflects bound-
ary-making practices, or what Krishna (1996) calls ‘cartographic anxi-
eties’ centring around questions concerning one’s nationalist identity
and survival and requiring a them–us distinction; an emotional or polit-
ical attachment to one’s place; and close feelings of nationalism and iden-
tification with one’s own territory. However, as Krishna also explains,
cartographic anxieties go much beyond mere ‘technical and scientific’
mapping of a country’s boundaries. They also include ‘representational
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practices’ that in various ways have attempted to inscribe ‘something
called India [and for that matter any nation] with a content, history,
meaning, and trajectory’ (Krishna, 1996: 82). This is because the central
attribute of nation formation and nationalist identity in international pol-
itics requires the production of a particular ‘configuration’ of territorial
space – that is ‘territorially disjointed, mutually exclusive, and [yet] 
functionally similar to other sovereign states’ (Ruggie, 1993: 144).
Accordingly, postcolonial nations including India have tried to configure
their territorial boundaries and also invest them with national political
sovereignty. Reconfiguring territorial boundaries, however, also means
that territories need to be constantly ‘guarded, re-made, and re-secured’
and it is the ‘production’ of an Other that secures the process of nation-
making (Ruggie, 1993: 144).
In understanding the ‘production’ of an Other in international politics,
the concept of security ‘imaginary’ becomes useful. In studying the
Indo–US (in)security dynamic, Muppidi defines security ‘imaginary’ as a
representation of danger that is the product of certain ‘field[s] of mean-
ings and social [ideological] power’ (Muppidi, 1999: 123). Operating
within frameworks of meanings, assumptions and distinctive social iden-
tities, representations of danger and what constitutes (in)security imagi-
naries are left open to the dynamics of interpretation, whereby relations
of identity, Otherness and (in)securities may be produced, enforced and
reified in a conflictual manner. Thus, (in)security imaginaries are created
through certain ‘codes of intelligibility’, often involving state leaders, and
become key in understanding the state’s (or its leaders’) divergent per-
ceptions of statist identity, the location of the Other vis-a-vis that identity
and (in)security (Muppidi, 1999: 124; Weldes et al., 1999: 1–2).
The importance of these perspectives for this article is that they allow
us to understand that states – as paradoxical entities – do not possess pre-
existing stable identities. As a consequence, all states are marked by a ten-
sion to adjust to the many axes of their nationalist identity in order to
represent an ‘imagined’ community (Anderson, 1983). Central to this
process of constituting a state’s identity is the state’s security/foreign pol-
icy and its construction of danger, both of which serve to consolidate the
state’s identity. This is because if a state faces no dangers then this would
imply an absence of movement via stasis as a result of which it would
wither away. Accordingly, a state’s security/foreign policy by inscribing
certain ‘codes of danger’ helps to contain and reproduce the state’s
boundaries, and, ironically, guarantees for the state an impelling identity
(Campbell, 1992: 11). How the drive to ‘fix’ the Indian state’s identity
reflective of a secular-modern and a Hindutva identity has enabled the
state (or its leaders) to incorporate gender to articulate divergent nation-
alist identities, cartographic anxieties and (in)securities is undertaken in
the rest of my analysis.
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CONGRESS AND THE MAKING OF A MODERN INDIA
The concept of India’s geopolitical vision has an implicit connection with
the project of modernity. On the one hand, national movements in India
were reacting to the subjugation inherent in colonization and thus indica-
tive of politically ‘counterhegemonic’ projects. Yet, the reigning models of
nation-building in postcolonial India were derivative of the western expe-
riences of modernity. Influenced by the emergence of the liberal state in
Europe in the late 18th century, India’s political leaders like Nehru
attempted to conjure into existence the postcolonial state of India in terms
of a territorial/political integrity. This is because given India’s colonial
history its leaders recognized that a nation’s unity was essential to its for-
mation and survival. Since an important aspect of a modern state in terms
of ‘producing’ nationalism is that the rulers and the ruled share a com-
mon nationality, the concept of a territorial/political nationalism along
with the secular ideology of Sarvadharma Swamabhava (all religions are
equal) provided the foundations of India as a modern state. In articulat-
ing a secular nationalism, Nehru was particularly aware that ‘bringing
religion into politics meant the ruin of both’ and claimed that ‘it was for
the Hindus to make the larger number of Muslims . . . feel at home in
India’ (Nehru, cited in Parthasarathy, 1989: 9). However, the secular
nationalism of Nehru did not preclude some majoritarian nationalists,
such as Sardar Patel, from making their presence felt during the debates
over constitution-making (Balachandran, 1996). In fact, one can argue that
such Hindu sentiments, although subdued from dominating India’s for-
mal politics, did exist underground and resurfaced on a national scale in
1998, facilitating the resurgence of the BJP (a point to which I return later).
For now, I proceed to build on Krishna’s concept of cartographic anxi-
eties to show how nationalist representational strategies used by the
immediate post-independence secular Congress Party leaders – centring
on abducted Indian women’s repatriation policies – have drawn on
women’s bodies and images to articulate India’s geopolitical visions and
national (in)securities. My aim is to highlight how the Indian state’s dis-
courses interweaving India’s nationalist identity, gender and perceptions
of (in)securities have remained political in nature, the discursive repre-
sentation of which becomes overtly cultural/communal under the BJP.
Territorial Nationalism, Geopolitical (In)Securities and Gender in
Modern/Secular India
Like any other postcolonial nation, India’s ‘boundary-making’ exercise,
the very condition of its territorial nationalism, has defined India’s post-
colonial (in)security imaginary. In this context, as Muppidi (1999: 124–5)
points out, the boundaries of this imaginary are reached when particular
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representations of the Other seem ‘unintelligible, irrational, or ungras-
pable’ in and through the lenses of the articulators of this (in)security
imaginary. The conception of a sovereign, autonomous (Indian) state to be
formed after independence from its colonizer had first legitimized the
(in)security imaginary of the then colonial India. In the postcolonial era,
this imaginary was rearticulated vis-a-vis an Other/Pakistan that was
carved out of the violent partition of the country. Thus, the postcolonial
Indian state’s efforts to produce external dangers not only emerged from
its drive to secure its identity but also from an (in)security pegged to
India’s partition history. Accordingly, ‘cartographic anxieties’, understood
as ‘physical preservation of [India’s] borders [to be] metonymous with the
state of the Union’, justified postcolonial Indian political actors’ dis-
courses of (in)security (Muppidi, 1999: 121). Gender became integral to
the Indian state’s nationalist discourses to inscribe its boundaries, anxi-
eties and (in)securities.
As Nehru himself had once argued, ‘nothing adds to popular passions
more than stories of abduction of women, and as long as these . . . women
are not rescued, trouble will simmer and might blaze out’ (Jenkins, 1974:
52). The connection implied in this statement between Indian women’s
‘abducted’ bodies (as violated by abduction, enforced conversion and
impermissible cohabitation) and securing India’s nationalist boundaries
vis-a-vis this abductor/Pakistan has thus fuelled the major debates sur-
rounding India’s (in)security. For example, in the aftermath of partition
the Indian government was swamped with complaints by relatives of
abducted women seeking to recover them either through government,
military or voluntary efforts. In this act of recovery, carried out by the
government through the Central Recovery Operation (1947–52), the
‘material, symbolic, and political significance’ of the abducted women
was not lost either on the women themselves or on the leaders of the state
(Menon and Bhasin, 1996: 5). Leaders of the Indian state, guided by cer-
tain masculinist notions – which I term a traditional/Indian masculinity –
repeatedly used instances of rape and abduction of their ‘innocent’ Indian
mothers and sisters to articulate India’s nationalist identity (as a territo-
rial space) vis-a-vis Pakistan. They expressed their concern and anger at
the ‘moral depravity’ that characterized the ‘shameful chapter’ in the 
history of both countries. That, ‘our [India’s] innocent sisters’ had been
dishonoured was an issue that could not be looked upon with equanim-
ity (Constituent Assembly of India, 1947: 122). The All India Congress
Committee passed a Resolution (November 1947) that stated that:
The Congress views with pain, horror, and anxiety the tragedies of Calcutta,
East Bengal, Bihar. . . . These new developments in communal strife . . . have
involved . . . mass conversion, abduction, and violation of women and
forcible marriages. . . . Women who have been abducted and forcibly married
must be restored to their homes. (Constituent Assembly of India, 1947: 122)
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Further, members of the Indian government also drew from
cultural/religious icons (of Ram and Sita) to underscore their protectionist
stance vis-a-vis Indian women. Said one member of the Indian parliament:
If there is any sore point or distressful fact to which we cannot be reconciled
under any circumstances, it is the question of abduction and non-restoration
of Hindu women. We all know our history . . . of what happened in the name
of Shri Ram when Sita was abducted. Here, where thousands of girls are con-
cerned, we cannot forget this. As descendants of Ram we have to bring back
every Sita that is alive. (Constituent Assembly of India, 1949: 137)3
The issue of abduction was also analysed by the Indian leaders in terms
of India/Pakistan’s ‘civilised/uncivilised’ identities. This is because, as
Anderson (1983) observes, passionate human loyalty reaches unprece-
dented heights when the nation imagined as a monolithic community
faces an (Other) differentiated community. This sentiment was reflected in
a Resolution passed by the All India Congress Committee in November
1949, which also drew upon Indian women to configure the Indian/Self
and Pakistani/Other:
During these disorders, large numbers of women have been abducted . . .
and there have been forcible conversions on a large scale. No civilised 
people can recognise such conversions and there is nothing more heinous
than the abduction of women. Every effort must be made to restore women
to their original homes. (Constituent Assembly of India, 1949: 138)
Interestingly, as Menon and Bhasin (1996) note, nowhere was the
Government of India’s condemnation of ‘rape’ anxious to take action
against the abduction of Muslim women by Hindu men (instances of
which were many) because here no offences had been committed against
the Hindu community or religion.
Furthermore, at the Constituent Assembly (Legislative) Session held in
December 1951, considerable dissatisfaction was expressed at the slow pace
of recovery of Indian women from Pakistan. There was extreme disquiet at
the mention of 2000 Indian women being held by government servants in
Pakistan and at a ceasefire being agreed to by the Indian government with
Pakistan over Kashmir without negotiating the return of Hindu women
abducted there. Some members of the Indian parliament even went so far
as to call for ‘an open war to recover our sisters and daughters lying help-
less in Pakistan’ (Constituent Assembly of India, 1951: 138).
It is not my intention to suggest here that the predicament of these
abducted women taken to the Pakistani side was not traumatic, nor that the
Government of India’s repatriation programme was not humanitarian in
seeking to return these abducted women to their ‘rightful’ places. Yet, I also
share Menon and Bhasin’s (1996) view that one cannot argue that the lots of
all these abducted women were uniformly grim and that all their abductors
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on the Pakistani side were ‘bestial’. Menon and Bhasin, as well as a Hindi
movie from India Pinjar (Skeleton), provide examples of Indian women who
despite being abducted by Muslim males to Pakistan were unwilling to
return to India during the repatriation and resettlement programmes con-
ducted by the Indian state because, although originally abducted, they had
by marriage settled with their new families in Pakistan where they were
accepted and respected. Such examples that contradict the ‘negative’ image
of Pakistan were undocumented or ignored in India’s statist accounts that
sought to secure the nation and its women. In this context, one may argue
that the Indian government’s Recovery Programme enabled the govern-
ment to draw upon the ‘identification needs’ of the Indian state (as caring,
secular and modern, which the Other was not) to construct itself vis-a-vis
Pakistan; articulate a (statist) vision of what constituted the ‘legitimate’
place of Indian women in their families, communities and the nation; and
also use victimized images of women (while denying autonomy to their
lived experiences) to define a threatening Pakistani nation. Moreover, the
Other was identified at the most ‘crucial’ site of patriarchal control, i.e. over
the issue of Indian/Hindu women’s sexuality that by implication belonged
to the paternal realm of the Indian state.
While some may argue that for India the urgency of securing both its
borders and (women’s) bodies is understandable – an urgency rooted in
the making of a postcolonial nation – I argue that this had a political
implication for women, since abducted women became symbolic of
demarcating territories, crossing borders and articulating (in)securities
associated with violating or consolidating the social, cultural and political
boundaries of the Indian and Pakistani states.
Indeed, India’s nationalist discourse sheds light on the fact that India’s
political nationalism was not homogeneous and despite its modernist-
secular identity, was no less silent in drawing on women’s bodies to artic-
ulate (in)security imaginaries vis-a-vis an Other/Pakistan. I am also
cognizant of the fact that the Indian state’s masculinity has also drawn
from Hindu religious/cultural metaphors of Ram and Sita to justify
India’s boundaries vis-a-vis the other nation. I also accept that the
Congress Party’s nationalism was implicitly Hindu-centric – an aspect
further evidenced in the contradictions that emerged in post-Nehru
Indian prime ministers’ theory and practice of secularism – which, some
argue, created a ‘space’ for the emergence of the BJP. Yet I argue that the
discursive interpellation of Indian nationalism with women’s bodies to
define the nation’s identity, (in)security and the location of Pakistan in it
constituted a political/nationalist (and not a communal/nationalist)
activity for the Indian state’s leaders under the Congress Party. This
means that, reflective of the newly born Indian state’s ‘geopolitical’ vision
(that sought to conjure a strong political/territorial integrity), its leaders’
perception and articulation of statist identity, the Other (Pakistan) and
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India’s (in)securities were reflective of certain ‘cartographic’ (boundary-
making) anxieties that were rooted in the realist/political logic of inter-
national relations. The Indian state’s identity and (in)securities were thus
perceived in political terms; in other words, the politicization of gender
served the political/nationalist project for the Indian state under the
Congress Party.
In contrast, I describe in the following section how the boundary-mak-
ing exercise of India and its definition of a Pakistani/Islamic danger
assume a qualitatively different turn under the BJP. Gender and the
nation’s (in)securities also get rearticulated to support the BJP’s ideologi-
cal construct of India as a Hindu nation.
THE BJP AND REMAKING OF A HINDU INDIA
Several factors explain the resurgence of the BJP’s cultural/religious
nationalism and masculinity in contemporary India. It can be seen as a
legacy of the colonial construction of racial/religious identities, which
over the years has fanned the early and later Hindu nationalists’ mili-
tancy in countering colonial projections of Hindu ‘virility’4 as represent-
ing dilemmas of the secular Indian nation, which having become too
modern, secular and global had lost its indigenous cultural space
thereby necessitating its revival; and, that the pro-Hindu practices of
Congress Party leaders for electoral purposes created the space for the
resurgence of the BJP’s nationalism. Without entering into these debates,
I proceed in the remainder of this article to explore how the BJP, guided
by Hindutva ideology, has linked the nation’s internal and external anti-
Muslim anxieties to the reconstruction of the nation through 
gender, and its (in)security imaginaries through cultural/religious per-
spectives.
Cultural Nationalism, the Rashtra, Gender and (In)Securities
Like the Hindu RSS leader, Savarkar (1971), the BJP has sought to make
Hindutva its ideological mascot, which, rooted in the ‘one nation, one
people, one culture’ concept, redefines India as a Hindu rashtra (nation).
Pitrabhoomi (fatherland), jati (bloodline) and sanskriti (culture) were
identified by the BJP as the three principles of Hindutva. According to
the BJP, the first principle pitrabhoomi (fatherland), implies that to be a
Hindu one should be born within the territorial boundaries of India; the
second, jati (bloodline), claims that to be a Hindu one should establish
lineage from Hindu parents (who are Hindu by birth and not con-
verted); and the third, sanskriti (culture), implies that only those whose
sacred land (sacred to their religion) lies within their fatherland (India)
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actually have the moral basis for claiming citizenship of India (thereby
privileging a cultural/religious rather than a territorial concept of 
citizenship in India) (Deshpande, 1995). The BJP also finds a linkage
between Hindutva, the Hindu rashtra and a cultural/Hindu nationalism
in India. A suggested underpinning of this cultural/Hindu nationalism
in building a nationalist India becomes particularly visible in the BJP’s
1998 election manifesto. In the introduction, which spelt out the ‘vision,
faith, and commitment’ of the BJP, the manifesto declared that ‘the pres-
ent millennium began with the subjugation of our ancient land. Let a re-
invigorated, proud, and prosperous India herald the next millennium’
(BJP, 1998: 6). It ended with an ‘appeal’ to all ‘patriotic Indians’ to assist
the BJP in the task of reconstructing a nationalist India representative of
a composite culture (BJP, 1998: 80). However, the definition of this ‘com-
posite culture’ underpinning Indian nationalism echoes rather a com-
munal/Hindu-centric fervour. As expressed in the words of the then BJP
president:
. . . despite the composite nature of Indian culture, Hinduism remains by far
the most powerful and pervasive element in that culture. Those who lay
great stress on the composite nature of Indian culture, minimise this basic
fact. (BJP, 2000: 160)
Deemed essential by the BJP for the development of the nation, the con-
cept of ‘one nation, one people, one culture’ makes Hinduism the com-
mon denominator of India’s national identity, and forces one to use the
terms Hindutva, Hinduism and the Hindu nation synonymously
(Chowdhry, 2000).
The BJP’s commitment to Hindutva, underpinned by the assumption that
the land of the Christians and Muslims lay outside India, has enabled the
party to utilize this aspect of Hindutva to depict the Hindu nation’s enemies
through religious lenses. Thus, a part of the BJP’s nationalist agenda has
been to construct the Indian Muslims as a locus of ‘internal’ threat to the
nation and use Indian women (redefined by the BJP as Hindu women) to
justify this threat. Following are some illustrations to suggest how in the
party’s nationalist discourse ‘patriots’ and ‘traitors’ are defined in terms of
their religious affiliations and how gender remains integral to establishing
this image: a BJP woman member Rithambara supports the Hindus in the
1992 Ram Janmbhoomi riots5 as a ‘fight for the preservation of a civilisation,
for Indianness, for national consciousness’ (Kakar, 1996: 157); BJP spokes-
woman Sushma Swaraj suspects an alleged treachery on the part of the
Muslims against India because ‘the former rooted for Pakistan during the
Indo-Pakistan war’ (Chowdhry, 2000: 117); and another informant of the BJP,
projecting rape as a communal discourse, claims that ‘the rape of Hindu
women by Muslims becomes a strategy for the community to express 
their jehadi mentality, by inflicting such harms on a Hindu woman’s right to
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bodily honour and integrity’ (Uma Suresht, BJP member [women’s faction],
interview, New Delhi, 2003).
Indeed, some might argue that if the BJP’s nationalist discourse, like
that of the Congress Party, also draws upon Hindu women’s right to bod-
ily ‘honour and integrity’, then what makes the BJP’s nationalist discourse
any different from the Congress Party? I argue here that the masculinist
assumptions underpinning the BJP’s nationalist discourse, which
Banerjee (2005: 15) defines as an ‘armed masculinity’, assume a much
more militant, aggressive and communal tone that enables the party to
manipulate Hindu women’s images in ‘newer’ ways to rearticulate the
Hindu nation’s ‘cartographic’ anxieties and (in)securities, and to justify a
nuclear policy for the nation. I explain in the next section the concept of
‘armed masculinity’, and then relate it to gender and to the nuclear
(in)securities of the BJP.
Cultural (In)Securities, Gender, and Nuclearization of the Hindu
Rashtra
Banerjee (2005: 14–15) contends that a particular interpretation of Hindu
manhood, ‘armed and communal’, informs the BJP’s nationalist/commu-
nalist agenda. In this model, the Hindu male, which is an ideological con-
struct, is both a ‘Hindu soldier and warrior monk’. The Hindu male as a
‘Hindu soldier’ incorporates ideas of Hindu spiritual strength and moral
fortitude and as a ‘warrior monk’ represents certain virtues that enable
him to oppose an enemy that is ‘evil’ and ‘communal’. The Hindu male,
representing a ‘Hindu soldier and warrior monk’, is ‘defined by attributes
of decisiveness, aggression, muscular strength, and a willingness to
engage in battle [against an enemy defined along religious lines], and is
opposed to notions of femininity that is defined by traits such as weak-
ness, non-violence, compassion, and a willingness to compromise’
(Banerjee, 2005: 14). When these two attributes of Hindu masculinity
intersect, nationalist discourses of the Hindu Right rearticulate the
nation’s enemy, its women and political (in)securities vis-a-vis this enemy
along cultural lines. I suggest that Islamic phobias perceived by the
Hindu leaders vis-a-vis Indian Muslims (internally), as illustrated before,
get discursively transposed to phobias that the nation perceives vis-a-vis
Pakistan (externally). This is borne out in the following comment from a
BJP leader:
In the history of all violence against our women either the Indian Muslims
or their extended hand Pakistan has been the abductor community/country
that has revealed a lustful behaviour of its males towards our women. If
there is any reprehensible past which we cannot forget and forgive, it is the
abduction and torture of Hindu women by Pakistan during partition. (Ram
Kumar, BJP member, interview, New Delhi, 2002)
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Likewise another BJP leader informant says:
Recall our history: Hindu women from the Indian side had been kidnapped
to the other side of the border to the Northwest Frontiers and Rawalpindi,
and were stripped and paraded in Kabul; they were sold at the bazaars (mar-
ketplaces); if India should remember this history of its sisters, then it should
retaliate against Pakistan . . . and retaliate on the grounds of its sisters whom
our country has a tradition of protecting. (Madan Gupta, BJP member, inter-
view, New Delhi, 2003)
In perceiving their role as the ‘protectors’ of Hindu women, the BJP
leaders also situate their notions of (a Hindu) India ‘as a Ram Rajya [land
of the Hindu deity Ram], where the Sitas need to be protected against
Pakistan’ (Rakhal Saha, BJP member, interview, New Delhi, 2004). While
the same analogy of Indian women as Sitas was also used by the Congress
Party leaders, in the case of the BJP the whole discourse of women’s pro-
tection from an ‘enemy’ is rearticulated vis-a-vis a cultural context (unlike
the Congress Party, where the discourse was rooted in terms of a political
context). This cultural tone is evidenced from the rest of Saha’s quote that
‘some of our misguided brothers [meaning Hindu men] also have com-
mitted similar crimes [of abduction] to a certain extent, but greater fault
lies with the Pakistani community and its men’. I argue that this aspect of
the BJP’s cultural/Hindu masculinity (in comparison with that deployed
by the Congress Party) appears disturbing in two respects: first, in bring-
ing to light a relation between Hinduism and the Indian state; and second,
in using bodies of Hindu women in overtly communal ways in redefining
India as a Hindu nation. In such communal discourses, the collectivity of
Indian women is substituted by the term Hindu women. Additionally,
‘preparedness’ against this enemy, even if through a nuclear policy,
becomes imperative. A BJP informant states:
India should do something commensurate with the gravity of the situation
to retaliate. . . . One should understand that with the Islamic bomb in their
[Pakistan’s] hand, India needs to be prepared. . . . Not only because it is the
right thing to protect our bharatmata [motherland] and our sisters but also
because it is our tradition. (Madan Gupta, BJP member, interview, New
Delhi, 2003)
The aforementioned sentiments reveal the extent to which the BJP’s
discourses on Hindu women as ‘bounded collectivities’ vis-a-vis
Pakistan infuse the BJP’s nuclear policies. While much of this glorifica-
tion of traditional representations of Hindu women is seen by the party
as a necessary corrective so that a Hindu Golden Age can be brought
back to contemporary India, a deeper analysis of these sentiments
reveals that the depiction of Hindu women in their ‘traditionally threat-
ened’ capacities vis-a-vis Pakistan/Islam constitutes an effort by the
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party to justify a nuclear trajectory in Indo–Pakistan relations. In other
words, what I argue here is that the BJP’s concern for Hindu women
(reflective of the Sitas of the Hindu rashtra) is ultimately tempered by the
production of a communal/patriarchal visual-self, where the vulnerable
nature of Hindu women thus portrayed and the specific protective
norms envisaged for their protection, justify an anti-Pakistani (in)secu-
rity imaginary for the nation.
It would also be interesting to note that the image of Hindu women
envisaged as passive and traditional does not always remain so for the
Hindu leaders. In a sharp disjuncture from the traditional/Indian mas-
culinity of the Congress Party, which drew mainly upon women’s imagi-
naries as domesticated/passive entities, the BJP’s masculinity – armed
and aggressive – also calls women to rise above their traditional roles and
images. In this militant form, women become visible in the women’s fac-
tion of the BJP (called the Mohila Morcha) and become powerful orators
of the party’s ‘armed and communal’ masculinity. The Sadhvis (women
ideologues of the BJP) have erased outer markers of their womanhood –
jewellery, make-up and feminine dress – and have become aggressive,
powerful and masculinist to enter the realm of this nationalist discourse.
Expressed in their ‘chilling tones’ is a jingoistic fervour by which they
articulate a Pakistani nuclear danger that faces the Hindu nation and its
women that even justifies a Hindu bomb. Evidenced is the tone of mili-
tancy in the following extract from a woman BJP ideologue, who inter-
weaves religious overtones with militant images of Hindu goddesses like
Durga and Kali to characterize India’s Islamic adversary and to legitimize
the (Hindu) bomb:
Look at the Hindu goddesses. They all bear weapons in their hands. Kali
had a brahmastra [a weapon that goddess Kali carries]; Durga had a chakra
[another weapon carried by goddess Durga]. We need our ashtra [nuclear
weapon] too to fight the rakshas [demon] threatening our nation. (Kamla
Neogi, BJP member, interview, West Bengal, 2002)
According to Menon (2003), the presence of a few virulently anti-
Muslim women in the BJP does not imply that most of the Hindu women
attracted to the party are also anti-Islamic or militant. While this point is
well taken, one must also accept that the discursive ‘reinvention’ of
Hindu women in their militant form to support the party’s
nationalist/communalist and (in)security agenda represents the rise of a
‘new’ sexism in postcolonial Indian politics; one not so overtly manipu-
lated by the Congress Party. While the militancy of these female ideo-
logues is projected by the BJP as empowering women – by enabling them
as sovereign embodiments of the state to speak before a strategic Islamic
threat – I argue that the apparent spatial mobility allowed to these women
becomes contested, since their token liberalization is ultimately rooted in
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the party’s communalist/patriarchal image.6 In this sense, the BJP’s artic-
ulation of Indian–Pakistani identities, based on ‘unfathomable’
Hindu–Muslim differences, is not only reflective of British colonial con-
structions of Hindu–Muslim racial/religious identities, but appears more
disturbing given that the party uses its Hindutva-dominated masculinity
to utilize women to link the nation’s (cultural) identity, enemy and
(in)security perceptions. This rearticulation of India’s (or the Hindu rash-
tra’s) identity, gender and (in)security (unlike the Congress Party’s sym-
bolic representations) represents a nationalist/communalist project by the
BJP and justifies a new trajectory of interstate nuclear politics.
CONCLUSION: COLONIAL LEGACIES, MODERNITY AND
HINDUTVA IDEOLOGY – IMPLICATIONS FOR NATION,
GENDER AND (IN)SECURITIES
As Samaddara (2000: 31) argues, ‘we live in partitioned times . . . it is
within our post-colonial being, in our agony, pessimism and strivings’. In
this sense, the partition’s history is an incomplete one. It is an event of the
past and simultaneously a sign of the present. As the postcolonial Indian
state continues to grapple with its task of nation-building, forms of carto-
graphic anxieties have subsumed the state’s identity (as a Self) and have
enabled the state’s leaders to use various configurations of sexist ideolo-
gies to manipulate women as ‘markers’ of hostile interstate identities,
Islamic (in)securities and nuclear trajectories. In making this linkage
between nationalist identity, (in)security and gender, I am cognizant that
nationalist/fundamentalist regimes all over the world have essentialized
gender to serve their nation-building projects. Postcolonial India is no
exception in this, and both the Congress Party’s traditional/Indian and
the BJP’s Hindu masculinity have drawn on gendered representational
strategies to define India’s nationalist imaginations and cartographic anx-
ieties vis-a-vis the Pakistani state. Despite this commonality between the
Congress Party’s and the BJP’s masculinity (whereby both have repre-
sented a gendered nationalism of the Indian state), this article has found
it compelling to revisit the issues of nationalism, gender and national
(in)securities by linking the continuation and transformation of these
issues under two distinct historical phases of postcolonial Indian politics
– under the Congress Party and the BJP.
To this extent, I argue that whether it was the secular-modernist identity
of the Congress Party leaders (grounded in the logic of western
Enlightenment) or the Hindu nationalist identity of the BJP (rooted in the
aura of a Hindu Golden Age), both nationalist visions have selectively
reappropriated colonialist modes of communal representations in post-
colonial Indian politics. In this context, one may claim that despite the
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Congress Party’s apparent rootedness in a secular-modernity, the Indian
state under the party was patriarchal (revealed through its discourses of
repatriation); militarist (evidenced in its ‘muscle-flexing’ vis-a-vis Pakistan
through such discourses); and also drew from the metaphors of Hindu cul-
ture/religion to define the identity and (in)securities of the Indian state.
Despite this discursive interpellation of Indian nationalism with women’s
bodies – which was masculinist and militant – I argue that this interpella-
tion constituted a political and not a communal/cultural activity of the
Indian state under the Congress Party that was reflective of the newly born
nation’s ‘cartographic’ anxieties and political (in)securities.
In contrast, my article has drawn attention to a more problematic aspect
underpinning the Indian state’s masculinity – defined as a Hindu cultural
masculinity – that has become particularly interesting in the country’s post-
1998 politics. This is because the symbolic evocation of Hindu masculinity,
although in some ways a continuation of the Congress Party’s tradi-
tional/Indian masculinity, in so far as both have represented a gendered
nationalism of the Indian state, is more complex than the latter. Hindu mas-
culinity, representing the ideological construct of a ‘Hindu soldier and war-
rior monk’, is more militant and communal and has interwoven religion,
culture and gender to construct the Hindu rashtra and its Islamic (in)secu-
rities. In this context, the BJP replays more overtly the colonialist pursuits
of ‘mapping a (Hindu) empire’ based on essentialization of Hindu–Muslim
communal identities. While for the British colonial project such essential-
ization of Hindu–Muslim communal identities was a pragmatic step to
make the world (Oriental India) knowable to the (western) empire, for the
BJP (some 60 years later) such a replay of communalism may be argued to
represent a form of realpolitik – one of state craft – that incorporates the cul-
tural/religious biases of Hindutva to link nationalism, gender and Islamic
(in)securities to rebuild a Hindu nation. This well reflects Ruggie’s (1993:
144) claim that in international politics (re)configuring territorial bound-
aries also means that territories need to be constantly ‘guarded, re-made,
and re-secured’ and it is the production of an Other that precisely maintains
that process. To that extent, gender identity, namely a form of women’s mil-
itant identity or a new sexism, has been utilized by the BJP to serve its
nationalism/communalism and (in)securities.
NOTES
My sincere thanks to the two anonymous reviewers and the editor of the special
issue (Professor Barbara Einhorn) for their thoughtful and detailed comments on
this article.
1. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is the Hindu-Right government of India
that headed a national coalition from May 1998 through April 2004. It
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maintains ties with its parent organization the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak
(RSS) and upholds the ideology of Hindutva. Hindutva is rooted in the con-
cept of ‘one nation, one people, and one culture’ and depicts India as a
Hindu nation (I later elaborate in the text the three elements of Hindutva).
2. I undertake this analysis with reference to the Congress Party and the BJP
because these governmental phases represent two different visions of
India’s nationalist identities and (in)securities. Under the BJP, India tested
three nuclear bombs in May 1998 – followed by those of Pakistan.
3. In the Indian epic Ramayana, the story of Sita’s abduction goes as follows: Sita
(the princess-queen of Ayodhya and wife of Lord Ram), while in exile with
her husband, was abducted by the demon-king Ravana. Following this
abduction, a war ensued between Ram and Ravana, as a result of which Sita
was rescued. What becomes glorified in this legend by the Hindu nationalists
is the focus on Sita’s chastity, to prove which (since imprisoned by another
male) she had to go through fire (fire represents the Hindu god of purity).
4. Banerjee (2005) explains how colonial practices rooted in an Anglo-Protestant
interpretation of manhood have projected Indian males as ‘cowardly’;
showed preference for the ‘martial’ (Muslim) races over the ‘non-martial’
Bengalis/Hindus; and, unrealistically, depicted the Hindu–Muslim commu-
nities in colonial India as representing ‘unfathomable’ differences. Although
this antagonistic depiction of Hindus and Muslims in some ways coincided
with the indigenous Hindu view then prevalent in India of a staged deterio-
ration of the Hindu civilization, this overlap should by no means ignore the
politics of (communalist) identity construction espoused by the colonizers –
which ironically has re-emerged in recent postcolonial India.
5. The Ram Janmbhoomi-Babri mosque riots occurred in December 1992 in a
town called Ayodhya (India). It was the result of a religious dispute centring
on the Hindu fundamentalist claim that the Babri mosque built in 1528 for
the Mughal King Babur was constructed on the site of a Hindu temple.
Following communal instigation by the Hindu Right, thousands of Hindu
fundamentalist agitators destroyed the mosque.
6. Exploring such links between Hindu women’s militant agency and (a
Hindu) patriarchy, Sen (2007), in a recent study conducted in the slums of
Bombay, explores how the Shiv Sena women’s efforts at fomenting commu-
nal violence against their neighbouring Muslim communities may, in fact,
represent a rational survival strategy of these women to protect themselves
from the male violence that they encounter within their own families and
communities. (The Shiv Sena is a Hindu nationalist party that has been very
active in Indian national politics, especially in western India, since the 1990s.)
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